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LAW AND ATHLETE DRUG TESTING
IN CANADA
JOSEPH DE PENCIER*
The use of banned performance-enhancing drugs is cheating,
which is the antithesis of sport. The widespread use of such drugs
has threatened the essential intregrity of sport and is destructive
of its very objectives. It also erodes the ethical and moral values
of athletes who use them, endangering their mental and physical
welfare while demoralizing the entire sport community.
Mr. Justice Charles Dubin
I. INTRODUCrION**
Athlete drug testing, or doping control, is the testing of athletes for
use of banned substances or practices which enhance athletic perform-
ance. The use of banned substances or practices is against the rules of
virtually all "amateur" sports. While banned substances or practices
vary from sport to sport, those proscribed by the Medical Commission of
the International Olympic Committee are increasingly recognized and
applied. Doping control is the principal means of deterrence and en-
forcement for this pernicious form of cheating in sport.
Doping control involves a classic legal tension between group and
individual rights. Athletes as a group have an interest in fair competi-
tion. Doping is against the rules of sport and is, therefore, cheating.
However, individual athletes have an interest in fair application of the
rules, if only to avoid errors or fraud. Findings that an individual athlete
has cheated by doping must bear impartial scrutiny. There must be fair
* The author is a member of the Expert Advisory Committee on Doping Control, Can-
dian Center for Drug-free Sport, Ottawa, Canada. He is employed with the Civil Litigation
Section, Department of Justice, Ottawa, Canada. An earlier version of this paper was written
while seconded as Legal Counsel to the Canadian Center for Drug-free Sport. From 1988
thorugh 1990, the author was counsel to the Governement of Canada at the Dubin Inquiry.
Thanks to Robin Nunn, John Barnes, Robert Solomon, Stephen Richards, Graham Garton,
Stephen Haynes, Veronica de Pencier, Alain Pr~fontaine and Victor Lachance for their com-
ments as this paper was prepared. Portions of the earlier version of this paper, dealing with
the Australian Martin Vinnicombe, were published in the Official Newsletter of the National
Sports Law Institute: Australian Legal Challenge to Multilateral Agreement for Doping Con-
trol, 3 FOR THE RECORD 6 (Aug./Sept. 1992). The views expressed in this paper are those of
the author and not those of the Department of Justice or the Canadian Center for Drug-free
Sport.
** This article purports to be up-to-date as of December 31, 1993.
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procedures for an individual to challenge a finding of doping. Doping
control also raises potential conflicts between public law and private
rules. For example, possession of a banned substance may be a criminal
offence for all individuals as well as being punishable according to the
rules of sport in the case of individuals who are accredited athletes.
More fundamentally, the procedures for doping control, while in accord-
ance with private rules of sport, may be contrary to fundamental domes-
tic law such as constitutional rights. At an institutional level, both public
bodies and private self-governing sport organizations may have a role in
conducting doping control. Lawyers are increasingly becoming more ac-
tive in doping control, as drafters and administrators of testing and re-
view protocols, as advocates for alleged dopers or embattled drug testers
or as arbiters deciding whether findings of doping ought to stand in the
face of procedural or other challenges.
In Canada, all of these legal aspects of doping control have been ex-
perienced in the realm of so-called "amateur" sport. At the same time,
Canada is an internationally-recognized leader in addressing the use of
performance-enhancing substances and practices. The Canadian experi-
ence both reflects and diverges from that of other sporting nations gov-
erned by the rule of law and provides a useful yardstick for assessing
circumstances and progress elsewhere.
This article both describes the development of the current regime for
doping control in Canada, and outlines particular legal challenges to
doping control, concrete and hypothetical. The legal issues surrounding
doping control in a particular jurisdiction may raise the fundamental
sorts of matters described above. It appears that the legal aspects of
doping control will assume greater prominence as the variety of legal
means for challenging athlete drug testing are explored and exploited.
Until education, changes in the values of sport, social change at large, or
other means of discouraging and preventing doping by athletes have
greater effect, doping control and its attendant legal questions are likely
to occupy the attention of those concerned with cheating in sport by the
abuse of drugs.
This article does not address drugs and drug testing in "professional"
sports in Canada. Player drug testing is just emerging in the National
Hockey League, the Canadian Football League (or its American coun-
terpart, the National Football League), professional baseball, the Na-
tional Basketball Association (which recently awarded a franchise to
Toronto, Ontario), bodybuilding and other commercialized sports which
cater to television. Furthermore, principles of contract law, collective
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bargaining, the right to earn a livelihood and other predominant areas of
the law make this a discreet subject for academic exposition.
II. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR DRUG TESTING OF ATHLETES
A. Federal Government Jurisdiction and Involvement
in Amateur Sports
Once the sole domain of sports administrators and subject only to the
internal rules governing sport, doping control has become increasingly a
matter of public policy interest in Canada. The federal government has
played a central role in the development and implementation of doping
control, notwithstanding the fact that sports are governed at the national
level by private governing bodies. This article begins with the evolution
of the government's role.' An understanding of that role is necessary to
understand the forces that led to the creation of an independent and
arms-length agency responsible, among other things, for the coordina-
tion and the conduct of doping control in Canada for all "amateur"
sports. Coincident with or as a result of expanding government interest,
the legal aspects of doping control have become increasingly complex.
Ironically, the fundamental legal basis for doping control in Canada
is not regulatory; it is contractual. Arguably, the government of Canada
has no authority to regulate sport. But it provides funds to national
sport governing bodies on the condition that they enact rules against
doping. Individual athletes, who must be members of their sport's gov-
erning body to compete at the national and international level, agree to
abide by anti-doping rules and procedures as a condition of membership
and eligibility. Furthermore, individual athletes and coaches may be eli-
gible to receive federal government subsidies. One condition of funding
is the specific written agreement to follow applicable anti-doping rules
and doping control procedures. Urine sample collection has been pro-
vided independent of national sport governing bodies and government
on a contractual basis, first by the Sport Medicine Council of Canada,
and now by the Canadian Centre for Drug-free Sport. By and large, the
government of Canada has paid the bill for doping control.
1. The influence of government in sport in Canada cannot be underplayed. It is one of
the most significant features of organized sport in Canada, especially in the last thirty years.
"Because of the significance of sport in our culture, the Government [sic] of Canada, and the
provinces and municipalities to a lesser degree, have over the years expended a great deal of
public money in increasing amounts to encourage and promote athletic programs." Charles L.
Dubin, 1990 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Use of Drugs and Banned Practices
Intended to Increase Athletic Performance xv. [Hereinafter Dubin Inquiry or Dubin Report].
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1. The Beginnings of Federal Government Interest in Sport
A number of authors have traced the inception and growth of federal
government involvement in sport.2 The modem era might be said to
start with the Second World War and a continuing concern about fitness
and Canada's military capacity.3 Recruiting for the armed forces re-
vealed a substantial portion of the male population to be physically unfit.
One response was the short-lived National Fitness Act4, legislation "to
promote physical fitness of Canadians." Even after the demise of that
legislation, the federal government's interest did not disappear. In the
period after the repeal of the National Fitness Act, Parliamentarians ex-
pressed concern about a lack of national policy for both physical fitness
and for Canadians' performance in international competitions.5
2. Federal Constitutional Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction for a federal spending foray into the field of sport is not
at all clear. Prime Minister St. Laurent's Minister of National Health
and Welfare, Paul Martin, maintained that jurisdiction over sport was a
provincial (and municipal) responsibility. 6 According to Barnes, since
sports and recreation are aspects of health, culture and education, the
more general and direct responsibility falls to local, municipal and pro-
vincial bodies. He also notes that sports litigation more commonly raises
2. See, e.g., COR WESTLAND, FITNESS AND AMATEUR SPORT IN CANADA: THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS-AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1979); MACINTOSH ET AL., SPORT
AND POLITICS IN CANADA, ch. 2 (1987) (and the various sources they cite).
3. JOHN BARNES, SPORTS AND THE LAW IN CANADA 9 (1988).
4. S.C. 1943-44, c.29, R.S.C. 1952, c. 190, rep. 1953-54, c. 61.
5. WESTLAND, supra note 2, at c. 5. Other influential factors included the widely reported
June 30, 1959, speech of the Duke of Edinburgh to the Canadian Medical Association decry-
ing a general lack of fitness among Canadians and a joint conference of the Canadian Medical
Association and the Canadian Association for Health, Physical Education and Recreation
held in March, 1961. Id at c. 13; DON MORROW ET AL., A CONCISE HISTORY OF SPORT IN
CANADA, 326 (1989). In Recent Developments in Sports Law, 1988-1991, 23 OTTAWA LAW
REVIEW 623 (1991), John Barnes comments about the continued validity of the factors moti-
vating the federal government position leading up to enactment in 1961 of the Fitness and
Amateur Sport Act:
The Fitness and Amateur Sport Act was first enacted in a Cold War climate, and the
review [now completed in the form of the MINISTER'S TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL
SPORT POLICY, SPORT THE WAY AHEAD (1992)] must look to happenings in Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union as well as those in Seoul: perhaps the public
funding of capitalism's warriors is unnecessary now that the Communists have been
beaten.
Id at 637-638 (note omitted).
6. MACINTOSH, supra note 2, at 19.
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issues in provincial civil law, notably the general law of torts, contracts
and administrative law.7
However, the federal government may supplement private or provin-
cial support by making grants in exercise of federal spending power, pro-
viding the intervention does not amount to a regulatory scheme relating
to matters under provincial jurisdiction.8 The federal government's pres-
ence in health and education, areas in which it has little or no regulatory
authority, rests on proper exercise of its spending powers.9
3. The Fitness and Amateur Sport Act
The Fitness and Amateur Sport Act was enacted in 1961.10 According
to the debates in Parliament, "[t]he general enthusiasm for sport as an
expression of national pride was supported by a belief that the expansion
of international sport competitions was one of the ways in which the
Cold War could be diffused.... There is no evidence in the House de-
bate that sport organizations and interested individuals made any great
attempt to influence or change the Act."'
Section 3 of the Act sets out its objects "to encourage, promote and
develop fitness and amateur sport in Canada." According to Section 3,
the Minister of National Health and Welfare has a variety of financial
and other means at his or her disposal to accomplish those objects. Fur-
thermore, pursuant to Section 4 of the Act, grants may be made to any
agency, organization or institution carrying on activities in the field of
fitness or amateur sport.12 The government of Canada takes the view
that sections 3 and 4 of the Act combine to clothe it with sufficient legal
authority to fund sport. This now includes the funding of doping control.
7. BARNES, supra note 3, at 7.
8. Peter W. Hogg, CONSTITIJTIONAL LAW OF CANADA, 6-15-6-20 (3d ed. 1992).
9. According to Barnes, the enumerated constitutional bases for federal activity may in-
clude the residual authority of Parliament to make "Laws for the Peace, Order, and good
Government of Canada" (s. 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3 (U.K.)),
Parliament's jurisdiction in trade and commerce (s. 91(2)), taxation (s.91(3)), the military
(s.91(7)), criminal law (s.91(27)) and immigration and citizenship (ss. 91(25) and 95), or more
generally, based on a claim that sport is of some national or international significance.
BARNES, supra note 3, at 8, 49-51.
10. R.S.C. 1985, ch. F-25.
11. MACINTOSH, supra note 2, at 27.
12. A branch of the Department of National Health and Welfare, currently called Fitfless
and Amateur Sport Canada, was established pursuant to section 12 of the Act, which autho-
rizes the appointment of "such officers, clerks and other employees" as necessary to adminis-
ter the Act. Sport Canada is the unit with specific responsibility for elite or "high
performance" sport.
1994]
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Since passage of the Act, the focus of government in sport has
changed. From an early concern with the general health and fitness of
Canadians, involvement has come to focus on the more specialized field
of competitive sport, especially on high-performance sport. As Mr. Jus-
tice Charles Dubin noted in his report on Ben Johnson's positive drug
test, with that increased emphasis came, in turn, a corresponding in-
crease in the level of government funding:
But government funding comes at a price. From simply being a
means for improving the general health of Canadians, govern-
ment funding of sport has become a means for promoting the na-
tional, international, and social policies of the country. Sport is
relied upon to unite the country and to express Canadian culture
and identity; it is used as an instrument of social policy in re-
dressing gender inequality and discrimination against people with
disabilities and members of minority and lower socioeconomic
groups; it is used to ensure compliance with federal government
policies on bilingualism and regionalism; and it is used to express
governmental disapproval of political decisions by other govern-
ments. Perhaps most of all, sport is relied on to give Canada a
high, international profile as a modern, thriving, healthy, and
prosperous nation that values the ideals of fairness and honesty. 13
Commentators have noted that federal funding has bred financial de-
pendency on the part of sport governing bodies.' 4 This dependency has
facilitated government imposition of universal policies on all sport gov-
erning bodies as a condition of funding. 5 Such has been the case with
doping control.
B. Doping Control: The 1983 Sport Canada Policy
The history of doping in sport is well documented. 6 As Dubin
noted, until 1983, only two Canadian athletes had tested positive for
13. Dubin Report, supra note 1, at 5.
14. See, eg., MACINTOSH, supra note 2, pp. 148-50; MORROW, supra note 5, at ch. 12;
Dubin Report, supra note 1, at 529-35. According to the Minister's Task Force on Federal
Sport Policy, by 1989 national sport organizations received an average of 70% of their funding
from the federal government, almost exclusively from Fitness and Amateur Sport. MINISTER'S
TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL SPORT POLICY, SPORT: THE WAY AHEAD 217-223 (May, 1992)
("Task Force Report").
15. By 1991, the national governing bodies of seventy-one sports received funding from
Sport Canada. GOVERNMENT OF CANADA FITNEss AND AMATEUR SPORT: ANNUAL REPORT
1990-1991, at 31-32.
16. See, e.g., Dubin Report, supra note 1, ch. 2; ROBERT Voy, DRUGS, SPORT, AND POLI-
TICS, 3-11 (1991); and John Goodbody, "The Role of the Media", in REPORT OF THE 3RD
PERMANENT WORLD CONFERENCE ON ANTI-DOPING IN SPORT, (Bergen, 1991).
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banned substances. 17 At that time, both nationally and internationally,
anti-doping rules and procedures for doping control were weak and in-
consistent. However, a series of events shattered Canadian complacency:
well-publicized positive tests of Canadian and other athletes at the 1983
Pan American Games; the hasty abandonment of those games by other
athletes apparently to avoid testing; and the arrest at Mirabel Airport in
October, 1983, of four members of the Canadian national weightlifting
team in possession of a vast quantity of undeclared anabolic steroids.'
The federal government's response was quick if unilateral. 19 In De-
cember, 1983, Drug Use and Doping Control in Sport-A Sport Canada
Policy ("1983 Policy") was issued. It directed sport governing bodies to
develop anti-doping plans, including plans for the testing of athletes at
competitions and in training, and established withdrawal of federal fund-
ing as a penalty for a positive test. Funds were allocated for testing. The
Sport Medicine Council of Canada was identified to oversee testing and
advise Sport Canada on doping control.
The premise underlying the government's action was that sport gov-
erning bodies were incapable or unwilling to deal with doping, even if
anti-doping rules were well-established in some of the more problematic
sports.20 The Dubin Report came to much the same conclusion six years
17. Dubin Report, supra note 1, at 90.
18. For an American perspective on the 1983 Pan American Games doping scandals, see
Voy, supra note 16, at 80-89.
19. According to Macintosh,
[Minister of State for Fitness and Amateur Sport]
Hervieux-Payette made a spontaneous statement that Canadian sport federations must
take immediate steps to stop their athletes from using performance-enhancing drugs or
face the prospect of losing government funds. Sport Canada commenced work imme-
diately on the development of a comprehensive plan to ensure that sport governing
bodies were taking adequate measures to discourage athlete steroid and drug use."
Supra note 2, at 149.
20. See, e.g., Dorothy Dickie, Passing the Olympic Test, 8 CHAMPION 7, 9 (August, 1984)
(giving... then Director of Sport Canada Abby Hoffman's comments about the failure of
weightlifting's governing bodies to deal with doping); VYV SIMPSON AND ANDREW JENNINGS:
THE LoRDs OF THE RINGS: POWER, MONEY AND DRUGS IN THE MODERN OLYMPICS, ch. 15
(1992). The former Chief Medical Officer of the United States Olympic Committee also
strongly endorses the view that sport governing bodies have been ineffective in policing their
own anti-doping rules because of financial and other conflicts of interest. Voy, supra note 16,
at 101-113, 174. As former American sprinter and coach Pat Connolly testified:
"In 1983 when I heard about the USOC's [United States Olympic Committee] pre-
Olympic testing program that was allowing our athletes to find better ways to keep
from being detected by official testing, I felt betrayed-like a child whose parents had
deserted her." Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings on Steroid Abuse in America.
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later. In the 1983 Policy, the government of Canada took a lead in anti-
doping which it has never relinquished.
C. The Sport Medicine Council of Canada
Until 1991, doping control in Canada was conducted by the Sport
Medicine Council of Canada, through its Committee on Doping in Ama-
teur Sport.
The authority of the Council was derived from the 1983 Policy and
was made operative through direct government funding to the Council
for the provision of doping control services and advice. Consistent with
the 1983 Policy, sport governing bodies were required by Sport Canada
to look to the Council to conduct doping control. The relationship be-
tween the Council and the Government of Canada with respect to dop-
ing control was of the same contractual nature as now exists between the
Canadian Centre for Drug-free Sport and the government.
Parallel to these contractual bases for doping control, sport gov-
erning bodies for "Olympic" sports and their members were required by
the Canadian Olympic Association, and often by their international
sport federations, to have in place anti-doping policies including unan-
nounced doping control. Like the government of Canada the Canadian
Olympic Association relied on the Sport Medicine Council of Canada
for Canadian doping control. The 1984 Canadian Olympic Association's
"Policy on Doping and Drug Usage" and a subsequent revision in 1989
recognized the role of the Council.
D. Doping Control: The 1985 Sport Canada Policy
The 1983 Policy was revised effective September 5, 1985, by the Drug
Use and Doping Control in Sport-A Sport Canada Policy Update
("1985 Policy"). Along with some reorganization of the policy's provi-
sions, new sections were added to provide for "ad hoc random doping
control," to extend the sanctions to "individuals proven to have violated
anti-doping rules involving anabolic steroids" and to provide for an ap-
peal to the Minister of State for Fitness and Amateur Sport from the
withdrawal of eligibility for federal funding. This was the policy in force
at the time of the 1988 Summer Olympics in Seoul. As modified by the
1991 Canadian Policy on Penalties (which is discussed below), the 1985
Policy remains central to the anti-doping conditions Sport Canada at-
taches to federal funding of sport organizations and individuals.
The 1985 Policy noted the role of the Sport Medicine Council of Can-
ada, especially in the production of the Doping Control Standard Operat-
[Vol. 4:259
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ing Procedures, setting out the mechanics of athlete drug testing.21
These procedures are patterned after and entirely consistent with the
International Olympic Charter Against Doping in Sport and its an-
nexes.2 2 By 1988, the expenditure for testing alone was in excess of
$500,000.23
E. The Dubin Inquiry
Notwithstanding the 1983 and 1985 Policies, between 1983 and 1988,
several Canadian athletes were disqualified for using anabolic steroids-
a matter of increasing concern to the officials of Sport Canada. In 1988,
four of the seven weightlifters selected to represent Canada at the Seoul
Olympics were disqualified after testing positive for anabolic steroids
prior to their departure for Seoul. Of course, Ben Johnson was disquali-
fied following the completion of the 100 meter event when he also tested
positive for anabolic steroids. On his return to Canada, Johnson (among
many others) requested a thorough public inquiry into the circumstances
surrounding his disqualification.24
Mr. Justice Dubin, then Associate Chief Justice and now Chief Jus-
tice of Ontario, was named by the Government of Canada to conduct a
public inquiry and directed to make recommendations "regarding the
issues related to the use of such drugs and banned practices in
sport.. ."25 In his report, Dubin catalogued the failings of anti-doping to
date to include its narrow focus on athletes and their positive tests.2 6 He
concluded that "[t]he failure of many sport-governing bodies to treat the
drug problem more seriously and to take more effective means to detect
and deter the use of such drugs has also contributed in large measure to
the extensive use of drugs by athletes. '27 He also noted a laxity of inves-
tigation.' Dubin then pointed to the failure of Sport Canada to live up
to its responsibilities as spelled out in the 1983 and 1985 Policies.29 In
21. CANADIAN CENTRE FOR DRUG-FREE SPORT, DOPING CONTROL STANDARD OPERAT-
ING PROCEDURES, (October, 1993). This is the current version.
22. INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC CHARTER
AGAINST DOPING IN SPORT, (1990).
23. Dubin Report, supra note 1, at xviii.
24. Id.
25. Order-in-Council PC 1988-2361, October 5, 1988, at 1 (Reprinted in Dubin Report,
supra note 1, App. A).
26. See Dubin Report, supra note 1, at 518.
27. Dubin Report, supra note 1, at 519. Dubin is particularly critical of the anti-doping
efforts of the then Canadian Track and Field Association, now Athletics Canada. Id. at 568-69.
28. Id. at 519.
29. Id. at 535-37.
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the conclusions and recommendations of the Dubin Report, Dubin com-
mented that the Sport Canada 1983 Policy and 1985 Policy were vari-
ously "ineffective and were resisted," "not consistently enforced," "many
athletes and sport bodies ignored the [1985] policy," and "provisions
were honored in the breach. 30 .
Dubin concluded that a new approach needed to be taken to ensure
that the government's anti-doping policies were put into practice. A
central component of the new approach should be an independent and
impartial agency in charge of anti-doping matters, including doping con-
trol. Dubin recommended that the Sport Medicine Council of Canada
be given expanded responsibilities and assume the leadership in anti-
doping.3'
F. Doping Control: The 1991 Policy on Penalties
for Doping Infractions
One of the responses to the Dubin Report was the Policy on Penalties
for Doping Infractions, released September 17, 1991. Subsequently re-
vised as the Canadian Policy on Penalties for Doping in Sport, the heart
of the document addresses the penalties for "doping infractions" (the
use of banned substances or practices) and "doping related infractions"
(infractions other than use, such as counseling others to use banned sub-
stances, avoiding doping control or supplying banned substances). The
minimum penalty of four years for an infraction, and reciprocal recogni-
tion of penalties imposed by individual sport organizations, reflects a
broad consensus within the Canadian sporting community.
The Canadian Policy on Penalties for Doping in Sport is particularly
noteworthy for providing a framework for the determination of "doping
related infractions." Use of a banned substance or practice is not neces-
sarily the isolated and independent act of an athlete-often far from it.
The actions of coaches, trainers, team physicians, financial managers, or
fellow athletes, that promote or contribute to a "doping infraction" are
as deserving of punishment as those of the doper, and likely more so.
However, "doping related infractions" are less straight forward be-
cause they are not proven by the well-established and relatively conclu-
sive positive test. By definition, the "doping related infraction" requires
proof by other means. The Dubin Inquiry investigated and made find-
ings that "doping related infractions" had occurred (for example, in the
cases of track coach Charlie Francis and weightlifting coach Andrezj Ku-
30. Id.
31. Id. at 538-39, recommendation 11.
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lesza). Leaving aside the question of the definition of "doping related
infractions," their determination in particular cases is closely bound with
the requisite investigation which takes the place of the laboratory test
results for "doping infractions." It remains to be seen whether Canadian
sport organizations, including the Canadian Centre for Drug-free Sport
(described in the next section), will be able to conduct effective
investigations.
As with previous government imposed or initiated anti-doping poli-
cies, the Canadian Policy on Penalties became operative by virtue of
each sport governing body adopting it through its own constitutional
processes. This involved amending the anti-doping policies and the rules
of each sport to reflect the Canadian Policy on Penalties, including pro-
viding for the activities of the Canadian Centre for Drug-Free Sport.
Virtually all sport organizations agreed to the key definitions ("major"
and "minor," and "use" and "non-use" doping infractions) and the sport
eligibility and direct federal funding penalties set out in the document.
Through the first half of 1992, each is incorporating these provisions into
their own rules through their own constitutional provisions for rule
changes, including changes to anti-doping policies and rules.32
G. The Canadian Centre for Drug-free Sport
Another major response to the adoption of the recommendations of
the Dubin Report was the creation of the Canadian Centre for Drug-
free Sport. The Centre was not created by legislation.33 It is an in-
dependent agency incorporated pursuant to Part II of the Canada Cor-
porations Act.3 4 Letters Patent were issued April 29, 1991, and recorded
by the Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs on June 20,
1991.35
32. The current version of the Canadian Policy on Penalties for Doping in Sport is Appen-
dix 5 to the Doping Control Standard Operating Procedures, supra note 21.
33. This was a conscious decision. First of all, creating the Centre and giving it by statute
the regulatory mandate it has would likely have been beyond federal power as intruding on
provincial jurisdiction over "property and civil rights" and other matters. Secondly, section 90
of the Financial Administration Act, R.S.C.1985, ch. F-11, precludes the creation of federal
Crown corporations except as authorized by statute. Even if the constitutional issue could
have been overcome, there was concern that the necessary legislation would take too long to
move through Parliament. Because the Dubin Report strongly urged that doping control be
conducted by an independent (of government and of sport governing bodies) entity, it was
decided that an independent, federally incorporated and non-profit body would best respond
to Dubin's recommendations while avoiding problems of legal constitution and capacity.
34. R.S.C. 1970, ch. C-32 (as amended).
35. The Canadian Centre for Drug-free Sport was originally incorporated as the Canadian
Anti-Doping Organization. This was a generic title derived from a proposal made in the fall
1994]
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The Centre became operative in September, 1991, by virtue of a joint
announcement of the Minister of State for Fitness and Amateur Sport
and the Centre's Chairman, Dr. Andrew Pipe. The press conference at
which the Minister announced the Canadian Policy on Penalties also her-
alded the Centre's inception. During the period from the issuance of the
Centre's Letters Patent in April, 1991, until the September joint an-
nouncement, the Sport Medicine Council of Canada continued to con-
duct doping control on behalf of the Centre.
A fundamental premise behind mandating the Canadian Centre for
Drug-Free Sport with the conduct of doping control is that the drug test-
ing of athletes must be vested in a disinterested agency. It was felt that
the problems that led to the 1983 Policy and which were commented on
so pointedly by Commissioner Dubin could be addressed in no other
way. As discussed above, others have reached the same conclusion:
The leaders [of sport governing bodies] must resolve their con-
flicts of interest. As Dr. [Sic] [Robert] Voy observes, too often
"the fox looks after the henhouse."[Sic] Testing must be entirely
independent of national and international sports bodies, unaf-
fected by their preoccupation with medals and money. There has
to be proper accountability.36
The Centre has an independent board of directors who are not gov-
ernment nominees or appointments. The Centre's objects include devel-
oping and implementing rules and procedures regarding the use and
detection of banned substances and prohibited methods in Canadian
sport. Those objects also include participating in and providing leader-
ship to the international campaign against doping in sport. The Centre's
activities may be carried out throughout Canada and elsewhere. The
Centre is currently funded entirely by the government of Canada. The
Centre receives its funds in return for conducting certain anti-doping ac-
tivities, including doping control.
of 1990 by the Sport Medicine Council of Canada to the Government of Canada outlining the
salient features of an independent agency for anti-doping matters. Recommendation 11
would have had the Council expand to take on a larger role in anti-doping matters. See supra
note 31 and accompanying text. However, the Council itself felt that it would be better to
create a new and independent body and so advised the federal government. The name Cana-
dian Centre for Drug-free Sport was chosen in large measure to articulate a message that
would be easily understood and supported by the public.
36. SEBASTIEN COE ET AL., MORE THAN A GAME SPORT IN OUR TIME 73 (1992). See also
supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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H. Federal-Provincial Agreement: The Canadian Policy Against
Doping in Sport
Yet another part of the federal government's response to the Dubin
Report was to seek federal-provincial agreement on a comprehensive
approach to anti-doping at both national and provincial levels. In No-
vember, 1991, a meeting of the federal Minister and his provincial and
territorial counterparts endorsed and adopted the Canadian Policy
Against Doping in Sport. The document specifically recognizes the Ca-
nadian Centre for Drug-free Sport's role as the Canadian body responsi-
ble for doping control.
I. The Authority to Test Foreign Athletes
The authority of a Canadian anti-doping organization to test certain
foreign athletes has several sources. It can derive informally from ad
hoc requests from the doping control authorities of other countries or
international sport federations. It also springs from the Trilateral Anti-
Doping in Sport Agreement 37 between the governments of Australia,
Canada and the United Kingdom, reached in December, 1990 ("Trilat-
eral Agreement"). The Trilateral Agreement also provides for ex-
changes of information and expertise, reciprocal assessment and
evaluation, and coordination of both anti-doping procedures and poli-
cies. In the fall of 1991, Norway adhered to the Trilateral Agreement.
France, Switzerland and New Zealand, among other countries, have ex-
pressed interest in becoming parties.
Section 1.D of the "Operational Plan for Testing" of the Trilateral
Agreement specifically provides for the testing of one party's athletes by
another party in a country not party to the Trilateral Agreement. In
Canada, responsibility for the doping control provided by the Trilateral
Agreement and its "Operational Plan for Testing" resided first with the
Sport Medicine Council of Canada. Like all Canadian doping control
obligations, it was then assumed by the Canadian Centre for Drug-free
Sport on inception of its operation.
37. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Governments of Australia, Canada and
the United Kingdom Concerning the Reciprocal Development and Enforcement of Measures
Against Doping in Sport (1990-91) (on file with author).
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III. POTENTIAL CHALLENGES TO DOPING CONTROL IN CANADA 38
A. Introduction
Robert Solomon of the University of Western Ontario's Faculty of
Law has suggested that in analyzing the legal foundations of employ-
ment drug testing in Canada, one ought to examine contractual rights
and obligations before moving to legislative influences.39 Given that
doping control is conducted by agreement of the interested parties, the
same starting point is appropriate in this discussion of potential legal
challenges to doping control.
Even in the absence of specific enactments, doping control has be-
come a matter of public interest and government policy. Doping control
in Canada is not a private matter because of the role of government in
doping control in Canada. Therefore, there is a special need to consider
potential challenges rooted in constitutional, administrative and human
rights law. So while doping control becomes increasingly formalized
(and legalized) in the collective interest of "clean" athletic competition,
developments in Canadian law have enhanced individual rights. While
largely unproven forms of attack, they are likely to provide disgruntled
individual athletes, coaches, or others a wide choice of possible legal
weapons.
There is one important characterization on which the following dis-
cussion is based: athletes are assumed not to be "employees." It has
been strongly advocated that the Canadian system of direct financial
assistance to elite athletes constitutes a form of employment.4" Indeed,
at least one independent agency of the government of Canada appears to
38. This article does not deal with other possible challenges to doping control, the most
likely being to the International Olympic Committee or international sport federation rules or
Canadian Olympic Association policies requiring competitors to submit to doping control.
See BARNES, supra note 5, at 649-59. For example, in the United States, a member of the 1984
Olympic weightlifting team who tested positive for a banned substance was ultimately
unsuccessful in challenging the result. See Michels v. United States Olympic Committee, 741
F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1984).
39. Robert Solomon, Employment Drug Testing: Understanding the Canadian Legal
Framework, seminar presentation (March 25-26, 1992, Toronto). See also Robert Solomon
and S. Upsrich, An Ounce of Prevention.. .The Need for Comprehensive Substance Abuse
Policies in the Workplace (March 31, 1992), (draft paper for the Canadian Centre for Sub-
stance Abuse on file with author).
40. See, e.g., BRUCE KIDD & MARY EBERTS, ATHLETES' Rosn-s IN CANADA, 74-76
(1982); Allen L. Sack & Bruce Kidd, The Amateur Athlete as Employee; GovERNMErr AND
SPORT: The Public Policy Issues 52-57 (Arthur T. Johnson and James H. Frey eds., 1985).
Bruce Kidd testified before the Dubin Inquiry. As the Dubin Report notes, he advocated that
"Olympic athletes should not only have the rights of employees but should also be paid as civil
servants representing Canada abroad." Supra note 1, at 498.
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assume this is already the case.41 Barnes notes that athletes' duties re-
semble those of contracted workers and he comments on the modern
meaning of "amateur athlete:"
The term "amateur" no longer means "unpaid," but may be used
to refer to athletes who are not signed to professional employ-
ment contracts or affiliated with commercial circuits. Amateur
sports federations now focus on regulating payments and defining
eligibility, rather than perpetuating the myth of non-materialistic
purity. Amateur athletes include children, student athletes and
recreational participants. They also include state-funded, high
performance competitors who are subject to contractual agree-
ments with NSOs [national sport organizations] and who receive
grants or allowances from government agencies. A few of these
competitors are able to market themselves to generate private in-
come from endorsement contracts, prizes and payments for
appearances. 42
If athletes receiving federal funding or other sources of income ought
to be considered government employees or some form of independent
contractor, the analysis that follows might be different. For example, Ca-
nadian human rights legislation does more to protect an individual's
right to make a livelihood than it does the right to participate in organ-
ized sport. Employment drug testing would likely import different legal
considerations in contract law than consensual doping control. This is
not to mention the plethora of employment and labor-related legislation
enacted primarily at the provincial level (providing for workers' com-
pensation, occupational health and safety, minimum wages, collective
bargaining, and the like) that might apply and impact upon doping
control.
However, the more conservative view discounts "amateur" athletic
endeavour as employment. The Dubin Report does speak of athletic
"careers" but notes that federal funding through the Athlete Assistance
Program is designed to provide "modest financial support" and "not to
provide for a professional athletic career but to aid the athletes in pre-
41. The Privacy Commissioner of Canada has equated receipt of federal funding with
employment. OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMMISSIONER OF CANADA, DRUG TESTING AND PRI-
VACY 43-44 (1990) (discussing drug testing of athletes).
42. BARNES, supra note 5, at 674 (notes omitted). Even this definition is not without its
difficulties, at least with respect to the Olympics. By any definition, the Olympic Games now
includes the participation of full-blown professionals in many sports (such as tennis, basketball
and hockey). This is a result of the Olympic movement's abandonment of the traditional
concept of amateurism in favour of eligibility as determined for each sport by its international
federation.
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paring for their careers on retirement from athletic competition." 43 The
status quo would appear to be that "amateur" athletic participation, for
remuneration of any kind, should not yet be equated with employment,
at least not on the basis of receipt of federal funding. From a strictly
legal perspective, this article adopts the view of Commissioner Dubin
that federal funding to athletes is entirely ex gratia and that no athlete is
entitled by right to be funded. If an athlete is denied funding for refus-
ing to comply with conditions for funding, such as participation in doping
control, the athlete is not being denied any right.44 That is not to say
that athletes may not have a very real economic stake in and motivation
for maintaining their eligibility to participate in sport in the face of a
doping infraction.45 However, query whether such an economic interest
transforms an athlete into more than a participant in sport.4 6 Accord-
ingly, this article has not anticipated challenges to doping control based
on employment law or legislative protections (such as human rights en-
actments) addressing employment.47
43. Dubin Report, supra note 1, at 533. The most recent annual report of Fitness and
Amateur Sport Canada notes three components of the Athlete Assistance Program: financial
assistance to defray living and training expenses, provision of tuition support; and extended
assistance for two semesters following the end of a competitive career. FITNESS AND AMA-
TEUR SPORT, ANNUAL REPORT 1990-1991, supra note 15, at 20.
44. Dubin Report, supra note 1, at 491.
45. A cyclist's loss of opportunity to participate at the Seoul Olympics has been valued at
$20,000 by a Canadian court. Gillmour v. Laird, (1989) 13 A.C.W.S. (3d) 302 (B.C.S.C.), cited
in BARNES, supra note 5, at 694.
46. Chapter 21 of the Task Force Report, contains the results of a 1989 survey of annual
income of elite high performance amateur athletes receiving federal assistance through the
Athlete Assistance Program ("AAP"). Surveyed athletes had an average annual income of
$15,931, of which just over half ($8,050) was "sport-related" including the AAP stipends. Of
those surveyed, only 18% reported receiving appearance fees or prize money, only 16% re-
ported endorsement or sponsorship income, and only 5% reported a "professional athlete
salary" which averaged only $7,664. The Task Force Report also notes that the average an-
nual income of $15,931 is skewed by the small percentage earning higher incomes and that
most AAP athletes earned less than the average. This suggests that "full-time" athletes are
hardly "fully" paid athletes and certainly belies the notion that the majority of elite athletes
could claim that their livelihood depends on sport. Task Force Report, supra note 14, at 195-
96.
47. Nevertheless, note the American jurisprudence examining the status of scholarship
athletes and debating whether they are "employees" of the colleges and universities providing
financial scholarships. See, Coleman v. Western Michigan University, 336 N.W.2d 224 (1983)
(scholarship athlete "paid" by university but not "employee" for workers compensation pur-
poses); State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial Comm., 314 P.2d 288 (1957) (collegiate
scholarship athlete as "employee"); Taylor v. Wake Forest University, 191 S.E.2d 379 (1972)
(collegiate scholarship athlete as "employee"); University of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423
(1953) (collegiate scholarship athlete as "employee"); Van Horn v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n., Cal. Rptr. 169 (1963) (collegiate scholarship athlete not an "employee"). See also




Contracts and agreements are ubiquitous in doping control. By
agreement with the government of Canada, the Canadian Centre for
Drug-free Sport agrees to provide doping control. Government funding
to sport governing bodies is contingent on sports having anti-doping pol-
icies and programs and assisting the Centre to conduct doping control.
Athletes agree to participate in doping control as a condition of receiv-
ing federal funding through the Athlete Assistance Program. Elite ath-
letes almost invariably have agreements with their own sport governing
bodies which, among other things, reiterate their acceptance of anti-dop-
ing policies and their participation in doping control.
At first blush, the obligations of those requiring, those conducting,
and those submitting to doping control appear clear and well evidenced.
However, the efficacy of the agreements providing for doping control
depend on the capacity of the parties to make those agreements and the
absence of factors which may vitiate the agreement.
The capacity to enter into an agreement that is legally enforceable
depends on one's age, one's mental state, and in the case of a corporate
or like entity (corporation, club, association, union) the requisite author-
ity. Because many athletes are minors, the question of age in contractual
capacity is of prime interest in doping control.
48
1. Capacity and Age
At common law, minors do have the legal capacity to enter into bind-
ing agreements. For example, in Doyle v. White City Stadium Ltd.,4 9 the
court held as valid a contract between an infant boxer and the British
Boxing Board of Control, under which the infant received a license to
box, enabling him to become proficient with a view to becoming a pro-
fessional. As with the issue of medical consent to treatment, the com-
mon law has evolved a flexible test with respect to the age at which an
individual has the legal competency to make a binding agreement.50
That test has much to do with the individual's ability to understand the
Intercollegiate Athletics: A Chill Wind Blows", 18 JOURNAL OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY
LAW 131, 134-37 (1991) (giving a recent review of the case law and comment).
48. The following discussion raises many points that would have to be considered in the
case of a mentally disabled athlete seeking to challenge doping control.
49. [1935] 1 K.B. 110 (C.A.). See also, BARNES, supra note 3, at 216-219 (concerning
junior hockey contracts).
50. See R. Solomon and S. Usprich, Chapter 3: Providing Treatment to Young Alcohol and
Drug Users: A Review of the Legal Issues; DRUG USE BY ADOLESCENTS: IDENTIFICATION,
ASSESSMENT AND INTERVENTION, 61-62 (Helen Annis & Christine Davis, eds., 1991).
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consequences of their own commitments and actions. The younger the
child, the more reliance that will be placed on an individual's capacity.
Accordingly, if a minor has the capacity to understand and play ac-
cording to the rules, the special requirements of anti-doping rules ought
not to present a problem. Common sense suggests that if a minor has
the concentration and dedication to train and compete at the elite level,
he or she will have a more than adequate capacity to understand and
form a binding agreement for drug testing.
But a minor could attempt to repudiate an agreement to be subject to
doping control in the face of a request for a sample and claim that he or
she did not fully understand what was being agreed to. Could that minor
be sanctioned for such a refusal to be tested? Where a parent or guard-
ian agrees on behalf of a minor, and the minor subsequently commits a
doping infraction, should the consequences fall on the minor or the sig-
natory? 51 These are vexing questions for which there are no answers
outside of the facts of a particular set of circumstances.
The matter is further complicated by the myriad of legislation which
supplements or supplants the common law. In Canada, civil and prop-
erty rights are a matter of provincial jurisdiction.52 In Ontario, the Age
of Majority and Accountability Act establishes the age of eighteen as the
entry to adulthood and the dividing line between one's "majority" and
"minority." "Minors" do not enjoy all the same rights and privileges as
adults under many Ontario laws. For example, Ontario human rights
legislation only recognizes age discrimination starting at age eighteen.
But Ontario has no legislation dealing explicitly with a minor's contrac-
tual rights. On the other hand, in British Columbia, section 16.2 of the
Infants Act 53 specifically provides that a contract is unenforceable
against anyone under the age of nineteen except in specified
circumstances.
It is impossible to predict how a challenge to doping control by a
minor would be decided by a court. So much would depend on the cir-
cumstances, the jurisdiction and the individual minor.
51. Robert B.Kennedy has answered this question by writing,
"I know of no authority under which a waiver signed by a parent or guardian on behalf
of a child has been held enforceable against the child." Robert B. Kennedy, Assump-
tion of Risk, Inherent Risk Acceptable and Release of Liability, in THE CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUCATION SOCIETY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, SPORTS AND THE LAW 1.1.15
(materials prepared for a CLE seminar held April 14, 1989, in Vancouver, B.C.,
Canada).
52. See § 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 9.
53. R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 196.
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2. Circumstances Vitiating the Agreement
Mistake, misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, unconscionabil-
ity, or illegality, are all circumstances that may lead to negating an agree-
ment or contractual obligation. In the context of doping control in the
United States, duress has been raised to attack consent or agreement to
be tested. 4 On the other hand, in at least one Canadian case, consent to
doping control prescribed by sport rules was held to be implicit in partic-
ipating in the sport.5 However, there are no reported Canadian cases
where doping control has been challenged due to circumstances vitiating
an agreement.
Consistent with Recommendation 3(b) of the Dubin Report56, the
documents by which individuals join sport organizations, participate on
provincial, national and international teams, and receive government
funding increasingly make specific reference to anti-doping policies and
rules and procedures for doping control. So long as participating in
sport is viewed as a privilege, which by definition requires compliance
with the anti-doping and other rules of sport, it will be difficult in Can-
ada for an individual to argue that he or she was forced to agree to dop-
ing control, or unaware of his or her obligations. Even if the contractual
basis for doping control is sound, an individual may have many means of
attacking a positive test result or other finding that leads to a doping
infraction.
54. Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913 (1973); Derdeyn v. University of Colorado,
832 P.2d 1031 (1991). In Derdeyn, the Court commented: Although voluntary consent vali-
dates an otherwise unconstitutional search, the government bears the burden of proof in
showing voluntariness.
Here, several athletes, representing the class, testified as to the circumstances under which
each of them had signed the consent. That testimony revealed that, because of economic or
other commitments the students made to the University, they were not faced with an unfet-
tered choice in regard to signing the consent.
Hence, we find sufficient evidence for the trial court to conclude that the University failed
to demonstrate that the students voluntarily without coercion signed the consent forms ... Id.
at 1035 (citing People v. Carlson, 677 P.2d 310 (1984).
55. Ozubko and Chabot v. Manitoba Horse Racing Commission [1987] 1 W.W.R. 149
(Man. C.A.), leave refused, S.C.C. No. 20252-51, 87.06.25.
56. "THAT those responsible for administering federal funds ensure
(b) that organizations in receipt of federal funding require as a condition of membership that
athletes agree to comply with doping control rules, and make themselves available for
testing in accordance with the organization's own requirements and those of the Sport
Medicine Council of Canada; .... Supra note 1, at 527-528)
19941
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
C. Procedural Challenges
Doping infractions are conceptually no different than other breaches
of the rules of sport warranting discipline. There are numerous cases
involving the discipline of athletes and other members by their sport or-
ganizations and the particular procedural requirements for that disci-
pline to be valid. 7 Sport organizations are not immune from judicial
correction if they fail to follow their own rules58 or if they violate the
rules of natural justice in dealings with individuals.5 9 Furthermore, the
substantive sport rules themselves may be challenged as unreasonable.60
There is no reason to think that the Canadian Centre for Drug-free
Sport's Standard Operating Procedures for Doping Control and subse-
quent challenges to determinations of infractions are not subject to like
scrutiny. Indeed, both in Canada and other countries, procedural chal-
lenges to doping control have been the most frequent and successful
type of challenge.
John Evans discusses what might appear to be an intrusion of public
administrative law principles into relationships essentially governed by
the agreement of individuals to abide by the private rules governing
sport:
Whilst the legal relationships between members [of professional,
trade or sporting associations and trade unions] are governed by
contract, it is also the case that the monopolistic control over im-
portant areas" of human activity exercised by many such associa-
tions endows them with many of the characteristics of
governmental bodies. Thus, their rules are more akin to dele-
gated legislation that unilaterally binds those to whom they are
addressed, rather than to the terms of a contract that in any real-
57. See D. Ross Clark et al., The Rights of Amateur Athletes and the Obligations of
Coaches and Others to Amateur Athletes, in SPORTS AND THE LAW, supra note 51, at 3.2.10-
3.2.12 n. 16 (cites omitted).
58. See Kinnear v. Piper et al., (1978) 1 AC.W.S. 573 (Ont. H.C.), (granting an injunction
to prevent expulsion from a sport organization due to a failure to follow the organization's by-
laws). See also Omaha v. B.C. Broomball Soc., (1981) 13 A.C.W.S (2d) 373 (B.C.S.C.) (issuing
an injunction to prevent a suspension when there was no power to suspend in the sport organi-
zation's rules).
59. See Depiero v. Canadian Amateur Diving Assoc. Inc. et al., (1985) 32 A.C.W.S. (2d)
331 (Ont.H.C.), (quashing a decision of the sport organization's board to remove an athlete
from a team due to failure to give notice and a conflict of interest in board membership). See
BARNES, supra note 5, at 679, n. 287 (citing... St-Hilaire c. Assn. can. d'athl6tisme, ([1990]
A.Q. No. 42 (C.A.)), (coach successfully challenged a Commonwealth Games team selection
process when the Court found that there was an arbitrary exclusion of a well-qualified candi-
date (the applicant St-Hilaire) and a failure to publicise the selection criteria in a timely
fashion).
60. See Hanson v. Ont. Univ. Athletic Assoc. (1975) 11 O.R. (2d) 193 (H.C.).
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istic sense can be viewed as the product of bilateral negotiations
and voluntary acceptance. Hence the courts have interpreted the
rules of such bodies as not empowering them to expel members
without first affording a fair opportunity to be heard.... 61
The procedural requirements for legitimate sport discipline cannot be
specified exactly. They will depend on the nature of the infraction and
its consequences. It has been suggested that Gray v. The Canadian
Track and Field Association outlines the major elements that a sport or-
ganization ought to provide at a minimum: a notice of the infraction; an
opportunity to be heard by the disciplinary body; and the adherence by
the sport organization to its own rules.62 Barnes has suggested addi-
tional protections which would conform to the rules of natural justice
which require the presumption of innocence and the affording of a fair
opportunity to hear and rebut charges. In particular, he advocates that
the "accused" must be given adequate notice and information about the
case to be answered, and only those allegations of which he is informed
can constitute reasons for the decision. The hearing must allow
presentations from both sides, the deciding panel must be unbiased, hav-
ing no potential for benefit in the event of a particular outcome, and
there must be some opportunity for reconsideration or appeal. Accord-
ing to Barnes, basic principles of fairness must be observed, although it is
not necessary to conform to all the procedures of a formal trial with legal
representation and the application of the laws of evidence.63 Elsewhere,
Barnes has also pointed out that one aspect of fairness is the speed of the
disciplinary process. Because of the interests at stake, summary justice is
inappropriate and decisions must not be taken with "indecent haste. '64
The Canadian Doping Control Standard Operating Procedures details
the procedures for sample collection and sets out the requirement for
laboratory analysis and reporting of results. It has its own mechanisms
for challenging the sample collection and integrity of the sample custody
and control. There is an internal review based on an athlete's written
protest 65 with a further hearing before an independent arbitrator.66 The
athlete bears the burden of proof (on the civil standard of a balance of
probabilities) to show some error or departure from the testing proce-
61. John Evans, ed., de Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th, (1980), p.
573.
62. CLARK, supra note 57, pp. 3.2.10-3.2.12, and the cases cited at note 16 of that article.
63. See BARNES, supra note 3, at 146-147.
64. BARNES, supra note 5, at 658.
65. Supra note 21, §§ 2.10.7 and 10.1.
66. Id. at § 10.2.
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dures that is "substantial" and that impugns "the reliability of the test
result."6 7 The decision of the arbitrator is final and binding.68
The efficacy of procedural challenges to doping control is demon-
strated by the record of such challenges in Canada. Of the four chal-
lenges to be fully arbitrated, three were decided in favor of the athlete
challenging the doping control authorities' failure to follow their own
procedures.69 In the fourth case, the challenge was unsuccessful because
it was based on grounds not permitted by the Standard Operating Proce-
dures for Doping Control: the technical validity of the testing methodol-
ogy and results. 70 Furthermore, it has been held that the failure to
exhaust such internal remedies will result in dismissal of an application
for prerogative relief quashing a positive test result.71
Outside of Canada, challenges alleging failure to follow established
doping control procedures have enjoyed mixed success. Notable recent
cases involve German world champion sprinter Katrin Krabbe 72 and
67. Id. at § 10.2.12(v).
68. Id. at § Section 10.2.12(x).
69. See In the Matter of Glen Dodds and the Sport Medicine Council of Canada, Decision
of an Independent Arbitrator, May 21, 1987; In the Matter of Rocque Gameiro and the Sport
Medicine Council of Canada, Decision of an Independent Arbitrator, Mar. 23, 1990; In the
Matter of Jack McCann and the Canadian Anti-Doping Organization, Decision of an In-
dependent Arbitrator, May 5, 1992.
70. In the Matter of Kevin Roy and Sport Medicine Council of Canada, Decision an In-
dependent Arbitrator, Jan. 1, 1990. Consistent with Canada's obligations under the Trilateral
Agreement, the grounds for challenges accorded by the SOP are now unrestricted and include
such technical challenges. See supra note 21, § 10.
71. Gray v. The Canadian Track and Field Assoc. (1986) 39 A.C.W.S. (2d) 483 (Ont.
H.C.).
72. Katrin Krabbe and two colleagues were subject to short notice or unannounced test-
ing while training in South Africa, early in 1992. Lab analysis of the samples (conducted by
the International Olympic Committee's Medical Commission accredited lab in Cologne, Ger-
many) found the three samples to have come from the same person. However, irregularities
in the sample collection procedure and in the methods and time taken to ship the samples
from South Africa to Germany were found by the legal commission of the German Athletics
Federation to raise serious doubts about the integrity of the samples. See In re Grit Breuer,
Katrin Krabbe and Silke Moller, RA2/92 (Legal Committee of the German Track and Field
Athletics Association) (on file with another). The test results were invalidated and the three
athletes reinstated by their federation-in time for the Barcelona Olympics, where Krabbe
would have been a favorite in the women's 100 and 200 meter sprints. However, the German
Track and Field Athletics Association refused to accept the decision of its own Legal Commit-
tee. On May 31, 1992, the International Amateur Athletics Federation ("IAAF") announced
that the dispute would be sent to the IAAF's Arbitration Panel. In mid-June, that body con-
firmed the decision to reinstate Krabbe and her colleagues. In the matter of an Arbitration
concerning Grit Breuer, Katrin Krabbe and Silke Moller, IAAF Arbitration Panel, undated
(on file with another). Krabbe subsequently tested positive for the banned substance
clenbuteral and was suspended. See Krabbe Faces Long Drug Ban, GLOBE AND MAIL, Aug.
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American 400 meter world record holder Butch Reynolds.73 In a less
recent, but no less celebrated case, Swiss sprinter Sandra Gasser was un-
successful in challenging doping control procedures both before an In-
ternational Amateur Athletics Federation arbitration panel and the
English courts. 74
D. Constitutional Challenges: Division of Powers and The Charter of
Rights and Freedoms
The traditional form of Canadian constitutional challenge, that based
on division of powers arguments, would seem unlikely in the context of
doping control. Not only is the doping control conducted by the Cana-
dian Centre for Drug-free Sport largely a creature of federal spending
power within Parliament's authority, but it also enjoys the explicit recog-
nition of the Canadian Policy Against Doping In Sport, which is the fed-
eral-provincial agreement specifically recognizing the Centre's role.
15, 1992, at A16; Norman Da Costa Track Bands Upheld by IAAF, TORONTO STAR, May 22,
1993.
73. On October 4, 1991, a Doping Control Review Board convened by The Athletics Con-
gress ("TAC") found that Reynolds had cast sufficient doubt on the validity of the drug test
attributed to him. The Board found doubt about the integrity of the envopak zipper seals and
about the drug testing and analysis conducted by the International Olympic Committee ac-
credited Lafarge Laboratory in Paris. See In the Matter of Harry "Butch" Reynolds, Decision
of the TAC Doping Control Review Panel, Oct. 4, 1991. Based on the Panel's decision, the
TAC reinstated Reynolds for national competitions. However, the International Amateur
Athletics Federation ("IAAF") refused to accept the Review Panel's decision and required
the matter to be sent to an IAAF arbitration panel. That body upheld the suspension. In the
Matter of Harry "Butch" Reynolds and TAC, Decision of the IAAF Arbitration Panel, May 13,
1992. However, Reynolds then secured orders from United States District Court (one of
which led to an appeal through the United States Court of Appeal which the United States
Supreme Court refused to hear) permitting him to compete in TAC sanctioned meets and,
ultimately, the American Olympic Trials in early July. See Lisa B. Bingham, Arbitration of
Disputes for the Olympic Games: A Procedure that Works, 47(4) ARBITRATION JOURNAL 33,
35-36 (1992). He failed to qualify for the American team except as an alternate. However,
TAC and the United States Olympic Committee removed his name from the team roster and
refused to take him to Barcelona. Reynolds continued to pursue a civil action against the
IAAF and TAC in U.S. Federal Court. In December, 1992, U.S. District Court Judge Joseph
Kinneary awarded Reynolds approxiamately $27.3 million in damages (including exemplary
and punitive damages). See Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Federation, No. C-2-
92-452, 1992 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8625 (S.D. Ohio June 19, 1992). By the summer of 1993, Reyn-
olds attorneys were seeking to enforce the award by garnishing IAAF sponsorship money
from American corporate sponsors. See James Christie, Amateur Notebook, GLOBE AND
MAIL, July 15, 1993, at All.
74. See In the Matter of an Arbitration Initiated by Sandra Gasser and the Swiss Athletics
Federation, Decision of the International Amateur Athletics Federal Arbitration Board, Jan.
1, 1988; Sandra Gasser v. Henry Stinson and John Holt, High Court of Justice, Chancery Divi-
sion, No. CH-88-G-2191, June 15, 1988.
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Furthermore, the national and international organization of sport and
the requirements for consistent doping control procedures support ac-
tion at a national level. However, constitutional challenges based on al-
leged violations of guaranteed rights are a newer and less tested
possibility.
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms ("Charter") sets out
the fundamental rights of Canadians, those with constitutional protec-
tion.75 Anyone whose Charter rights and freedoms have been infringed
or denied may apply to the courts to obtain a remedy that "the court
considers appropriate and just in the circumstances." [section 24(1).]
The rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter most obviously
relevant to doping control are the "right to life, liberty and security of
the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance
with the principles of fundamental justice" (section 7) and the "right to
be secure against unreasonable search and seizure" (section 8). Both
sections have been the basis for judicial decisions striking down as un-
constitutional random drug testing of federal inmates conducted by the
Correctional Service of Canada.76 However, arguments that section 7
rights are violated by doping control were rejected by the Independent
Arbitrator hearing a challenge to a positive test.7 7 Furthermore, at least
with respect to section 8 "search and seizures," it has been held that the
Charter protection applies only where something has been taken by a
public authority without consent.78 Doping control is consensual.
Section 15(1) sets out "equality rights." Every individual is equal
before and under the law and has the right to equal benefit and protec-
75. Part I, Constitution Act, 1982, enacted as Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, 1982 c.
11 (U.K.).
76. Re Dion and the Queen (1986) 30 C.C.C. (3d) 108 (Que.S.C.); Jackson v. Joyceville
Penitentiary [1990] 3 F.C. 55 (T.D.). However, in Gray v. The Canadian Track and Field Asso-
ciation, the Court held that announced in-competition doping control did not violate an ath-
lete's rights under section 7. See supra note 71. Trosman believes that urine testing would be
found to be a "search" for the purposes of section 8 and could not be characterized as "rea-
sonable" under that section absent objective and individualized suspicion. Jeff Trosman,
Mandatory Drug Testing in Sports: The Law in Canada, 47 UNIvERsITY OF ToRorrro
FACULTY OF LAW REVIEW 189, 205-215 (1988).
77. In the Matter of Glenn Dodds, supra note 69, at 7-8.
78. R. v. Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417, 431. A recent decision of the Ontario Court of
Appeal discusses what is "consent" in circumstances where section 8 is invoked, setting out a
six-fold test (proving on a balance of probabilities the fact of consent-implied or express,
proper authority to give consent, the consent was voluntary, the consent was given with
knowledge of the nature of the police conduct for which consent was sought, awareness of the
right to refuse to consent and awareness of the potential consequences of consent) R. v. Wills,
(1992) 7 O.R. (3d) 337, 347-356 (C.A.).
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tion of the law without discrimination, including discrimination based on
a "mental or physical handicap."
However, the Charter has important limitations. For example, it ap-
plies only to government action.79 The acceptance of a contractual obli-
gation can, in some cases, constitute the waiver of a Charter right.80
Furthermore, the rights and freedoms it protects are subject to "such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society." [section 1.] There is no explicit protection
for property rights, including purely economic interests such as
employment."'
While it is clear that the Charter would apply to the actions of Sport
Canada, its application to doping control conducted by the Canadian
Centre for Drug-free Sport is uncertain. 2 Two earlier sport related deci-
sions have suggested that sport organizations are not subject to the
Charter even if they receive the bulk of their funding from govern-
79. One of the consequences is that government action authorized by legislation that
breaches the Charter may lead to the legislation itself being struck down as unconstitutional.
As a companion constitutional provision sets out, the Constitution of Canada is the supreme
law of the country and inconsistent laws have no force and effect: Constitution Act, 1982,
supra note 75, at § 52(1).
80. McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 230.
81. In the absence of a specific guarantee of property rights, various sections of the Char-
ter have been invoked to afford such protection, especially section 7. However, the Courts
have, by and large, rejected Charter challenges to restrictions on employment claiming a viola-
tion of the right to "life, liberty and the security of the person." See Charboneau v. College of
Physicians and Surgeons, (1985) 52 O.R. (2d) 552 (H.C.J.); Wilson v. Medical Services Com-
mission, (1988) 30 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal refused (S.C.C., November 3,
1988); and Bennett v. British Columbia (Securities Commission), (1991) 82 D.L.R. (4th) 129
(B.C.S.C.), overruled on other grounds.
82. In Barnes' view, and in spite of successful constitutional challenges in other contexts,
application of the Charter to doping control is "problematic." However, after reviewing a
small portion of the enormous body of American jurisprudence challenging doping control on
constitutional grounds, he concludes that government-sponsored drug testing may be suscepti-
ble to constitutional challenge in spite of athletes' "apparent 'consent' to the required working
conditions." BARNES, supra note 3, pp. 51-53 and BARNES, supra note 5, pp. 655-658. How-
ever, Barnes offers no real rationale why this corpus of American Fourth Amendment consti-
tutional jurisprudence might apply in Canada. In R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 823,
Madame Justice McLachlin reiterates a caution about applying American constitutional tests
in Canadian law even when there are analogous constitutional provisions. In R. v. Broyles,
[1991] 3 S.C.R. 595, 610, a case involving section 7 and an accused's right to silence, Mr.
Justice Iacobucci made passing reference to recent American constitutional jurisprudence on
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, but continued that Canadian courts should not hesitate to
develop a uniquely Canadian approach to the issue, in keeping with the overall goals of the
Charter. Furthermore, Barnes' views would appear to be predicated on a characterization of
athletes as employees which, as discussed above, is itself arguable.
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ments.8 3 On'the other hand, in the first challenge to a positive test pur-
suant to the Canadian Standard Operating Procedures for Doping
Control, the Independent Adjudicator agreed with the athlete's conten-
tion that doping control did fall within the purview of the Charter. He
concluded that doping control flowing from Sport Canada's 1985 Policy
and conducted by the Sport Medicine Council of Canada at the behest of
Sport Canada, and Sport Canada's influence through funding of sport
governing bodies, "all bespeak government action."'
Subsequently, the courts have developed a number of interrelated
tests for application of the Charter because the actor is part of the gov-
ernment, or the impugned action is sufficiently "governmental." Ac-
cordingly, the University of Guelph is essentially autonomous and not
sufficiently governmental even though created by statute, largely funded
by government, and performing a public service.85 On the other hand,
Douglas College, a community college in British Columbia, is a govern-
ment agency because it was established to implement government policy,
funded by government, subject to government legal direction, and con-
trolled by a board of governors appointed (and removable) by govern-
ment. 6 In a 1988 article on drug testing in sport, Jeff Trosman noted the
same sort of factors in arguing that a sport supervisory body created by
statute (he uses the example of the Ontario Racing Commission) would
likely be subject to the Charter.87 Assuming the Charter does apply,
query whether an athlete's consent to doping control does not preclude a
subsequent challenge based on Charter rights.
If testing were found to violate an enumerated Charter right-
notwithstanding prior consent-the requirement for testing in sport
might well be a "reasonable limit" on guaranteed rights that could be
"demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society" pursuant to
section 1.88 The work and report of the Dubin Inquiry, and similar in-
83. Re Blainey and Ont. Hockey Association, (1985) 52 O.R.(2d) 225 (H.C.); rev'd 54
O.R.(2d) 513 (C.A.); leave refused, S.C.C., June 26, 1986; Gray v. The Canadian Track and
Field Association, supra note 71.
84. In the Matter of Glenn Dodds and the Sport Medicine Council of Canada, supra note
69, at 7.
85. McKinney v. University of Guelph, supra note 80.
86. See Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Assoc. v. Douglas College, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 570.
87. Trosman, supra note 76, at 199. The Ontario Racing Commission, the regulating body
of horse racing and wagering, is continued by section 2 of the Racing CQmmission Act, R.S.O.
1980, c. 429.
88. At least in a section 7 case. Because the section 8 search and seizure provision con-
tains its own "reasonable" standard, it is difficult to see how a law impugned under that provi-
sion could be saved by section 1, thereby being "reasonably unreasonable". However, this
means that in section 8 case, the balancing inherent in the reasonable test will occur while
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quiries in Australia, Great Britain, Germany, and the United States, ap-
pear to have more than documented the nature and extent of the
problems for which doping control is a crucial and internationally sup-
ported response.8 9
However, it appears that the section 1 justification would not be
available in the case of the Canadian Centre for Drug-free Sport. Cana-
dian doping control is not provided for by legislation and, therefore, not
"prescribed by law" for the purposes of section 1. While the Supreme
Court of Canada has held that a limit prescribed by law within the mean-
ing of Section 1 may result by implication from the terms of a legislative
requirement or its operating requirements,9" and may be found in statu-
tory law or regulations, or even the common law,91 rules and guidelines
otherwise constituted are not sufficient. 2
E. Privacy Legislation
The Privacy Act 93 provides individuals with access to their personal
information held by the federal government. It limits those who may see
the information. It also gives individuals some control over the govern-
ment's collection and use of the information. The Act also creates the
Office of the Privacy Commissioner. The Privacy Commissioner may
consider complaints from individuals if a government institution is col-
lecting, keeping, using, or disposing of personal information contrary to
the Act.
applying the substantive right, and not in the context of the section 1 saving provision once a
substantive right (such as a section 7 right) has been found violated.
89. See, e.g., Australia, SENATE STANDING COMMrrEE ON THE ENVIRONMENT, RECREA-
TION AND THE ARTS, DRUGS IN SPORT. INTERIM REPORT, Canberra, 1989; Australia, SENATE
STANDING COMMrrrEE ON THE ENVIRONMENT, RECREATION AND THE ARTS, DRUGS IN
SPORT: SECOND REPORT, Canberra, 1990; Great Britain, AMATEUR ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION,
REPORT OF A.A.A. DRUG ABusE INQUIRY, 1988; and United States, Hearings before the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee on the Steroid Abuse Problems in America, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess.(1989), which led to the Steroid Trafficking Act of 1990.
90. See R. v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613.
91. See Re Ontario Film and Video Appreciation Society v. Ontario Board of Censors,
(1983) 41 O.R. (2d) 583 (Div. Ct.); affirmed, (1984) 45 O.R. (2d) 80 (C.A.); International Fund
for Animal Welfare Inc. v. Canada [1989] 1 F.C. 335 (C.A.).
92. Ontario Film and Video Appreciation Society v. Ontario Board of Censors, supra note
92 (mere guidelines established by an administrative tribunal for the exercise of its power to
censor films have no legal status); Weatherall and others v. Canada (A.G.) (1987) 59 C.R. (3d)
247 (F.C.T.D.); appeal allowed in part [1989] 1 F.C. 18 (C.A.) (directives issued by the Com-
missioner of Penitentiaries cannot be regarded as "law" within the meaning of section 1: they
are designed for the internal management of prison institutions and give rise to disciplinary
action but create no legal rights or obligations).
93. R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21.
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The Office of the Privacy Commissioner has expressed concern about
doping control. In his 1988-89 annual report to Parliament, Privacy
Commissioner John Grace opined that mandatory, unannounced ran-
dom testing "appears to ignore a concept which is fundamental to indi-
vidual privacy-the presumption of innocence" guaranteed by the
Charter.94
In 1990, the Privacy Commissioner issued a report entitled Drug Test-
ing and Privacy. Central to the report is the thesis that the results of
drug testing are "personal information" as defined by the Act. The re-
port's basic position is that drug testing is "extremely intrusive" of an
individual's right to privacy, especially when imposed randomly and
without "reasonable suspicion" safeguards.95 The report recommended
that government institutions should seek Parliamentary authority before
collecting personal information through mandatory drug testing. The re-
port sets out circumstances in which drug testing should be conducted
including: reasonable grounds to believe that there is a significant preva-
lence of drug use or impairment within the group; the drug use or im-
pairment poses a substantial threat to the safety of the public or other
members of the group; the behaviour of the individuals in the group can-
not otherwise be adequately supervised; there are reasonable grounds to
believe that drug testing can significantly reduce the risk to safety; and
no practical, less intrusive alternative, such as regular medical examina-
tions, education, counselling, or some combination of these, would sig-
nificantly reduce the risk to safety.96
Drug Testing and Privacy is particularly critical of mandatory, unan-
nounced random testing of federally funded athletes. It suggests that
such testing is contrary to sections 7 and 8 of the Charter, and could not
be justified under section 1 according to the tests set out in recommenda-
tion 2 (given above). It also suggests that such testing would be contrary
to the Privacy Act itself.97
However, the Privacy Commissioner's comments may not be well
founded. First, because drug testing of athletes has never been con-
ducted directly by Sport Canada or some other government agency, it is
94. Dubin Report, supra note 1, at 492. Dubin dismissed the Privacy Commissioner's
views: "With the greatest respect, the issue of random testing does not engage the provision
of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms concerning the presumption of innocence .... The right
to presumption of innocence has no application to issues of drug testing in sport." Id. at 492-
93.
95. DRuG TEsTING AND PRIVACY, supra note 41, at 1.
96. See id. at 24-25, Recommendations 2 and 3.
97. See id. at 43-44.
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doubtful that the Privacy Act even applies.9" As the Privacy Commis-
sioner's most recent annual report notes, because the Canadian Centre
for Drug-free Sport is not a federal agency, it is not subject to the Act. 99
Second, the Privacy Commissioner's Charter analysis appears predicated
on the assumption that receipt of federal funding constitutes athletes as
federal employees.100
Most fundamentally, the Privacy Commissioner overlooks the con-
sensual nature of doping control; it is not imposed externally but de-
manded by those most directly affected. As Dubin noted, the most
vigourous opponents of cheating in sport through use of banned sub-
stances and practices are athletes and coaches. He concluded that they
represent the vast majority of Canadian coaches and athletes.10'
F. Human Rights Legislation: The Canadian Human Rights Act
In addition to the rights of the individual protected by the Charter
from government action, human rights legislation prohibits improper
discrimination in the provision of services and employment, public or
private sector.10 2 Reflecting the somewhat uneasy constitutional posi-
98. See id. at 43, (noting that a drug testing program would "if conducted by Sport Can-
ada" be a violation of the Privacy Act").
99. OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMMISSIONER, ANNUAL REPORT-PRIVACY COMMIS-
SIONER-1990-1991 (1991). The Privacy Commissioner goes on to speculate that the creation
of the Canadian Centre for Drug-free Sport outside government "may have been a deliberate
attempt to circumvent the [Privacy] Act." Id.
100'.It was both surprising and disappointing to note that the government's position-
as expressed to Dubin by senior officials of Sport Canada-was that federally-funded
athletes should be subjected to random, mandatory and unannounced urinalysis for
banned substances.... This position was surprising because of the government policy
of rejecting drug testing in the employment setting except in circumstances where there
are overriding public safety concerns.... Charter rights also apply to federally-funded
athletes. Like other employees, these athletes receive monthly cheques from the gov-
ernment for their efforts."
(DRUG TESTING AND PRIVACY, supra note 41, at 43).
101. Dubin Report, supra note 1, at 488. Note that Dubin devotes an entire chapter of his
report to detail some of the evidence he heard from athletes on this subject: chapter 23, Ath-
letes and Coaches Against Drugs. He reiterates the point in stating at pages 520-521: "Indeed,
the strongest opponents of drugs and cheating are the athletes and coaches who do not engage
in such practices but whose own reputations have been blemished by the doubt cast upon all
athletes and coaches by the conduct of those who do cheat." Id. at 520-21.
102. Not all differentiation is discriminatory. Discrimination is adverse differentiation,
where the impugned distinction relates to personal characteristics of an individual (such as
age, sex or disability) and where it has the effect of imposing obligations or burdens not im-
posed on others or limiting opportunities not limited to others: Andrews v. Law Society of
British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 174 (paraphrasing McIntyre, J.).
1994]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
tion of federal government mandated doping control, a challenge might
be based on either federal or provincial human rights law.10 3
The Canadian Human Rights Act' 4 applies to matters coming within
the legislative authority of Parliament. [Section 2]. The requirement of
sufficient federal government nexus, for application of the Act, is likely
the same as for application of the Charter. Section 3(1) of the Act pros-
cribes discrimination on, among other grounds, "disability," which is spe-
cifically defined in section 25 to include a "previous or existing
dependence on alcohol or a drug." The Canadian Human Rights Com-
mission's (non-binding) policy on drug testing takes a rather broad view
of "dependence" (which is not defined in the Act). It states that the
Commission will receive complaints alleging discrimination based on dis-
ability, including "drug dependence," "perceived drug dependence," and
"other disability" revealed by drug testing.105 "Discriminatory prac-
tices" include denying "the provision of goods, services, facilities, or ac-
commodation generally available to the general public," or "to
differentiate adversely in relation to an individual" on a proscribed
ground of discrimination. [Section 5]. It is also a "discriminatory prac-
tice" to refuse employment or to differentiate adversely in relation to an
employee on a proscribed ground of discrimination.
Exceptions are set out in Section 15. For example, it is not a discrimi-
natory practice to differentiate in relation to employment based on a
"bona fide occupational requirement" [Section 15(a)] or in the provision
of goods, services, facilities, or accommodation if "there is a bona fide
justification" for that differentiation [Section 15(g)].
If the Act applies to the drug testing of athletes, and an athlete can
demonstrate a "disability" relating to drug use (in the Canadian Human
Rights Commission's eyes, a dependence or perceived dependence on a
performance enhancing substance), and some action based on that disa-
bility is taken contrary to the athlete's interests-such as withdrawal of
103. The Dubin Report discounted the possibility that doping control was contrary to Ca-
nadian human rights legislation by stating:
"human rights legislation enacted by the Province of Ontario has been held to apply to
private sport organizations. Similarly, legislation in other provinces may well have the
same application. These statutes set out enumerated grounds of discrimination. To
require all athletes within a sport federation to agree to random testing as a condition
for eligibility could not, in my opinion, be viewed as discriminatory." Supra note 1, at
494.
However, the Dubin Report contains no analysis to substantiate this conclusion.
104. R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6, § 2.
105. Policy 88-1, January, 1988. It should be noted that this policy does not distinguish
between dependency on legal and illicit drugs.
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eligibility for federal funding-it may be that the Act has been contra-
vened. However, dependency on a performance enhancing drug consti-
tuting a "disability" is far from a clear equation. The Commission's
policies are not determinative and do not have the force of law. Further-
more, it is not obvious that federal funding or other support is a "good,
service, facility, or accommodation customarily available to the general
public." By definition, high performance or elite sport athletes are ex-
traordinary and quite distinct from society and the public at large. Of
course, the employment-related proscriptions will only apply to athletes
if receipt of federal funding constitutes employment.
But these questions may never even be reached. It is arguable that
the Act does not apply to drug testing conducted by an independent
agency at arms-length-especially in view of the jurisdictional uncertain-
ties discussed above.
However, these hurdles must be seen in light of the jurisprudence
relating to human rights legislation which seeks to give it liberal and ex-
pansive application. To take a recent example, in Rosin v. Canada'01 ,
the Federal Court of Appeal considered whether a specialist military
parachuting course offered by the Canadian Armed Forces to its mem-
bers was a service or facility customarily available to the general public
pursuant to the federal Act. In upholding a Human Rights Tribunal rul-
ing that it was, the Court noted:
In the interpretation of human rights codes, the Canadian courts
have consistently accorded them a meaning which will advance
their broad purposes. Our courts view human rights codes not as
ordinary statutes, but as special, as fundamental, as "almost con-
stitutional" in nature. For example, Mr. Justice Lamer, as he then
was, declared a human rights code "is not to be treated as another
ordinary law of general application. It should be recognized for
what it is, a fundamental law."'" 7
The Court goes on to cite Chief Justice Dickson that human rights
legislation must be given "a fair, large, and liberal interpretation as will
best ensure their objects are attained" and that the courts "should not
search for ways and means to minimize those rights and to enfeeble their
proper impact."' 0 In this prevailing climate, it would be imprudent to
totally discount the possibility that a human rights complaint alleging
106. [1991] 1 F.C. 391 (C.A.).
107. Rosin, 1 F.C. at 397 (citing Insurance Corp. of B.C. v. Heerspink, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 145,
158, 43 N.R. 168; Robichaud v. Canada (Treasury Board), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 84, 75 N.R. 303).
108. Rosin, 1 F.C. at 398 (citing Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (Canadian
Human Rights Commission, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114, 1134).
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discrimination due to disability that is related to banned substances
could not be successful.' 09
Regardless of the jurisdiction, human rights commissions take a dim
view of drug testing in any strict non-medical setting. For example, in
January, 1988, the Canadian Human Rights Commission went on record
as being against the use of test results, or using refusal to be tested, as a
basis for differential treatment of an employee or potential employee,
even though it acknowledged that the Canadian Human Rights Act does
not specifically prohibit drug testing.110
G. Human Rights Legislation: The Ontario Human Rights Code
Federal jurisdiction over sport is sufficiently uncertain in that the ap-
plication of federal human rights legislation is not assured in the field of
drug testing (assuming it applies at all). Because the Canadian Centre
for Drug-free Sport has its head office in Ontario, any challenge to dop-
ing control based on provincial human rights legislation is most likely to
be made pursuant to the Ontario Human Rights Code"' ("Code").
The Ontario Code is similar to the federal legislation although it re-
fers to "handicap" and not "disability" as a prohibited ground of dis-
crimination. [Part I, "Freedom from Discrimination"]. Section 1
provides that every person has the right to equal treatment with respect
109. The Task Force Report states that the federal government's Fitness and Amateur
Sport Branch ought to expect the organizations it funds to meet the "values" of what it de-
scribes as the Charter of Human Rights of Canadians. See supra note 14, at 141, Recommen-
dation 57. The Report may be referring to the Charter, to the Canadian Human Rights Act or
to both. Regardless, this is another indication of the public policy if not legal trend to ex-
panding the ambit of such protections for individual rights.
110. Policy 88-1, supra note 106.
111. S.O. 1990, c. H-19. Barnes notes the case of a 16-year-old girl from Denmark pre-
vented from playing in the boys division of an international soccer tournament sanctioned by
the Canadian Soccer Association and held in Ontario. A Human Rights Tribunal considering
a complaint under the federal Act held that the national sport governing body's involvement
in the exclusion did not have the character of an inter-provincial undertaking or national con-
cern, and did not qualify as a commercial or corporate activity such that the federal lawv ap-
plied. Any remedy would have to be sought under provincial legislation. BARNES, supra note
3, at 67, (citing Wood v. Canadian Soccer Association, (1984) 5 CH.R.R. D/2024 (Human
Rights Tribunal, Jan. 12, 1984)). In a more recent case, the Supreme Court of Canada dis-
missed an appeal from the Ontario Court of Appeal decision holding that the National Dental
Examination Board of Canada was subject to the Ontario Human Rights Code. The Supreme
Court held that the Board was not operating under the Peace, Order and Good Government
clause or the Trade and Commerce power under section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and
that simple federal incorporation was not sufficient to oust the jurisdiction of the provincial
human rights commission and law. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v. National Dental
Examining Board of Canada, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 121, 122.
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to services, goods and facilities without discrimination because of handi-
cap. Section 5 gives the same freedom with respect to employment.
"Because of handicap" is defined in section 10(1) to include having or
being believed to have any degree of physical disability or infirmity, or a
condition of mental impairment, or other specified conditions. Section
11 proscribes "constructive discrimination" when a "requirement, quali-
fication or consideration," although not itself discrimination on a prohib-
ited ground, would nonetheless result in the "exclusion, qualification or
preference of a group of persons identified by a prohibited ground of
discrimination." However, there is an exception when the "requirement,
qualification or consideration" is "a reasonable and bona fide one in the
circumstances."' 2 Furthermore, a right is not infringed if a person is
incapable of performing or fulfilling "the essential duties or require-
ments attending the exercise of the right" because of a handicap."
3
However, it is arguable whether use of or dependency on a perform-
ance enhancing substance or practice could be characterized as a "handi-
cap" under section 10(1). One would think that use of banned
substances or practices is a real advantage, not a disadvantage or handi-
cap; otherwise the substances and practices would not be banned.
The Ontario Courts have held that the Code imposes on those who
offer services in the field of sport the obligation of making accommoda-
tion to the needs of handicapped persons who may wish to participate,
up to the point of undue hardship-to the sport." 4 The Youth Bowling
112. S.O. 1990, c. H-19, § 11(1)(a). Section 11(2) goes on to place an onus on the party
alleged to be discriminating to demonstrate that the needs of the group to which a complain-
ant is a member cannot be accommodated without undue hardship, considering relevant costs
and health and safety requirements.
113. Again, there is an onus to demonstrate the inability to accommodate as worded in
section 11(2): S.O. 1990, c. H-19, § 17(2).
114. (1991) 75 O.R.(2d) 451 (Div.Ct.). Cases dealing with pre-1981 provisions of the
Code concerning access to "public facilities" had held that amateur sport organizations were
not subject to the Code. See, e.g., Cummings and Ontario Minor Hockey Association (1978) 7
R.F.L.(2d) 359 (Ont. Div. Ct.), affirmed (1979) 10 R.F.L.(2d) 121 (Ont. C.A.); and Ontario
Human Rights Commission and Bannerman v. Ontario Rural Softball Association (1979) 10
R.F.L.(2d) 97 (Ont. H.C.). However, in Re Blainey and Ontario Hockey Association (1986) 54
O.R.(2d) 513 (C.A.), a provision of the Code excepting discrimination on the basis of gender
by sports organizations was struck down as contray to the Charter of Rights and Freedom.
While the Ontario legislation gives an exemption from the provisions of the Code to "recrea-
tional clubs," that exemption is limited to the prohibited grounds of discrimination of age, sex,
marital, or family status. See § 20(3). The applicability of human rights legislation to sport
bodies mut be examined on a province-by-province basis, and depending on the circum-
stances. For example, in Nova Scotia, Beattie v. Acadia University (1976) 72 D.L.R.(3rd) 718
(N.S.C.A.), held that access to intercollegiate sport is not protected by provincial human rights
legislation; however, the legislation did apply to house league hockey and was used to uphold
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Council case involved a young physically handicapped bowler who could
not compete without the assistance of a ramp to launch the bowling ball
down the alley. The provincial sport governing body excluded her from
competing in a tournament. She complained to the Ontario Human
Rights Commission of discrimination on the basis of physical handicap.
The Commission substantiated the complaint and ordered it be consid-
ered by a board of inquiry. The board agreed with the complaint and
ordered the provincial sport governing body to permit the competitor to
participate in tournaments with the ramp. The Youth Bowling Council
appealed.
The Divisional Court held undue hardship to sport to be reached
when the proposed accommodation would impact significantly upon the
way in which other participants would be required to play or would give
the accommodated person an actual advantage over others in such par-
ticipation. On the evidence before it, the Court was not willing to con-
clude that use of the ramp was advantageous compared to the deliveries
of the other bowlers. They were able to impart spin on their bowling
balls and vary the velocity of delivery, two aspects of the act of bowling
that the ramp virtually precluded. Furthermore, the evidence estab-
lished that use of such ramps was not unique to the competitor in ques-
tion or to Ontario. So, in the terms of sections 10 and 16 of the Code,
the Court found the prohibition against using the ramp in competition
not to be reasonable or bona fide in the circumstances (section 10(a))
and found the competitor able to perform or fulfill the essential require-
ments of the activity notwithstanding the handicap.
The Youth Bowling Council case indicates that it may be easier than
it would appear to meet the initial hurdle of applying the Code to com-
petitive sport. Nevertheless, even if a competitor could then character-
ize use of or dependence on a banned substance or practice a "handicap"
for the purposes of the Code, there would appear to be ample evidence
to support the requirement for avoiding banned substances and prac-
tices, and for doping control, as "reasonable and bona fide... in the
circumstances." However, the Youth Bowling Council case might well
encourage complaints to the Ontario Human Rights Commission. Given
the antipathy to drug testing of any kind displayed by human rights com-
missions, complaints could well lead to at least board of inquiry proceed-
ings under the Code.
a complaint by an eleven year old girl denied registration by a (boys') hockey association.
Forbes v. Yarmouth Minor Hockey Association (Nova Scotia Board of Inquiry, October 27,
1978) unreported decision referred to in BARNES, supra note 3, at 76.
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H. Civil Actions in Tort
An action seeking damages or some other relief connected to doping
control is unlikely to occur without some other successful challenge. If
an athlete was successful in a procedural challenge to a positive test re-
sult, but missed a critical competition while the challenge proceeded, he
or she could well claim for damages, citing as negligence whatever prob-
lem sustained the challenge. The action would likely name at least the
Canadian Centre for Drug-free Sport, the certified doping control officer
who conducted the sample collection, the sport governing body, and Her
Majesty the Queen in right of Canada (as represented by Sport Canada)
as the sanctioning bodies, and depending on the circumstances, the test-
ing laboratory.
The usual principles of tort law would apply. The plaintiff would
bear the burden of demonstrating on a balance of probabilities that the
Centre, the laboratory, or other relevant organizations or individuals,
owed him or her the requisite duty of care; that the problem was indeed
negligence and not some mistake of a lesser order; that the negligent act
breached the duty of care; that the consequences suffered by the plaintiff
as a result of that breach were reasonably foreseeable; that damages
were suffered by the plaintiff; and that the damages were sufficiently
connected to those consequences that the Centre and others ought to be
held responsible. The consequences could include loss of the opportu-
nity to compete, loss of reputation, and loss of federal funding, commer-
cial endorsements, appearance money, or other sport-related income.
It would be hard to characterize the Centre and its certified doping
control officers as not having a legal duty of care toward those subject to
doping control. It seems that the most difficult part of the plaintiff's case
would be to establish that the misdeed during doping control constituted
a negligent act, and to demonstrate the consequences; and, therefore,
damages attributable to that negligence. Nonetheless, at a time when
elite sport becomes increasingly a full-time activity, and with commercial
possibilities flowing from athletic performance in an ever wider array of
events and sports, the adverse consequences to individuals of problem-
atic doping control are more likely to give rise to successful claims for
monetary compensation.
No such challenges have been pursued in Canada since the initiation
of doping control, despite arbitral decisions overturning positive test re-
sults for failure to adhere to the requirements of the Doping Control
Standard Operating Procedures.
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IV. OTHER LEGAL UNCERTAINTIES
Doping control in Canada has become increasingly subject to legal
pressures. Those pressures can be expected to increase as litigants ex-
plore public law recourse. Furthermore, changes to testing protocols will
also generate legal issues. The Australian situation-with a Canadian
twist-illustrates certain perils of doping control becoming less and less
the responsibility of sports administrators and more and more that of
lawyers and law-makers.
A. Legislating for Doping Control
The Australian counterpart of the Canadian Centre for Drug-free
Sport is the Australian Sports Drug Agency ("ASDA"). ASDA was cre-
ated by an act of the Commonwealth Parliament, the Australian Sports
Drug Agency Act 1990 ("ASDA Act"). 1 5 The ASDA is responsible for
drug testing, the development and implementation of education and re-
search policies and programs, and promoting the adoption of uniform
drug testing policies and approaches to drugs in sport both in Australia
and internationally. 16 The ASDA is specifically authorized to perform
its functions within or outside Australia." 7 The ASDA receives its fund-
ing directly from the Commonwealth Parliament."' The Common-
wealth Department of the Arts, Sport, the Environment, Tourism and
Territories is responsible for the legislation. Doping control procedures
are prescribed by regulation in the Australian Sports Drug Agency
Regulations."9
The other key player in Australian anti-doping is the Australian
Sports Commission ("ASC"). It too was established by legislation: the
115. No. 18 of 1991, assented to Jan. 21, 1991, with a date of commencement of Feb. 17,
1991.
116. The "objects" of the ASDA are set out in section 8 of the Act and include encourag-
ing "the practice of sport free from the use of drugs, in a manner consistent with the objectives
of protecting... the health of competitors.. .the values of fair play and competition and the
rights of those who take part in sport." Section 8(d) calls for the "establishment of a central-
ized drug sampling and testing program that exposes all competitors to sampling and drug
testing, at short notice, at sporting events, during training and at any other time." Section 8
also encourages the "development and maintenance of drug testing laboratories accredited by
the International Olympic Committee" and promotes the "adoption, at an international level,
of uniform sampling and drug testing procedures, and of educational programs relating to the
use of drugs in sport."
117. ASDA Act, § 9(4).
118. ASDA Act, Part 7.
119. Statutory Rules 1991 No. 19, notified in the COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA GA-
zETrE on February 18, 1991.
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Australian Sports Commission Act 1989.120 The ASC is responsible for
the development and coordination of anti-doping policies for national
sport organizations through its funding links with them. The ASC has
developed a Doping Policy which specifies the obligations of sport orga-
nizations in testing athletes, hearing cases where a breach of its policy is
alleged to have occurred, determining penalties, and reviewing sanc-
tions. 21 The policy also requires sport organizations to use ASDA to
conduct doping control and to support the ASDA's education and infor-
mation initiatives. Adherence to the ASC Doping Policy, or develop-
ment of a policy consistent with it, is a condition of ASC financial
assistance.
There was a serious challenge to this impressive legal edifice. In
May, 1991, the then Sport Medicine Council of Canada tested Martin
Vinnicombe, an Australian cyclist competing in the United States. Vin-
nicombe tested positive. However, he is challenging the sample collec-
tion procedure as inconsistent with and contrary to that conducted by
the ASDA.
The Canadian testing of Mr. Vinnicombe was in response to an
ASDA request to the Council dated May 20, 1991, and pursuant to an
ASDA "Letter of Authorization for Out of Competition Drug Testing"
dated May 22, 1991. The sample was taken on May 25, 1991. At that
time, Vinnicombe signed the Council's applicable Doping Control Form
in which he declared that he was satisfied with the manner in which the
sample-taking procedure was carried out. The "A" and "B" samples
were sent to the International Olympic Committee accredited Labora-
tory in Montreal for analysis. 22 On May 30, 1991, the laboratory found
the "A" sample to contain stanozolol, a banned anabolic steroid. The
"B" sample was analyzed on June 11, 1991, and confirmed the finding of
stanozolol. That information was relayed to the ASDA. Vinnicombe
was informed of the positive test result on June 15, 1991, in Australia.
Consistent with the rules of his national and international sport federa-
tions, Vinnicombe received a two-year suspension, effectively denying
him participation in the next Olympic Games.
Vinnicombe never denied that he had in fact used stanozolol. 23 On
the contrary, he commenced legal proceedings in the Federal Court of
120. No. 12 of 1989, asssensted to Mar. 16, 1989.
121. AUSTRALIAN SPORTS COMMISSION, REVISED DOPING POLICY, (Sept., 1992).
122. It is one of three International Olympic Committee accredited laboratories in North
America, the other two being in Los Angeles and in Indianapolis.
123. In fact, Vinnicombe made this admission during the course of judicial proceedings.
See Martin Vinnicombe v. The Australian Professional Cycling Council Inc. et al., Federal
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Australia challenging the ASDA's reliance on the Sport Medicine Coun-
cil of Canada's conduct of doping control. He claimed that the test re-
sults ought to be invalidated because of the variations between doping
control as set out in the ASDA Act and ASDA Regulations and as set
out in the Canadian Doping Control Standard Operating Procedures.
On March 18, 1992, Judge Morling of the Federal Court suggested
that there be mediation between the ASDA, ASC, Vinnicombe and the
national amateur and professional cycling federations. R.J. Ellicott, a
former Commonwealth Minister responsible for sport was appointed as
the Referee. As a result of disagreements about the scope of the media-
tion, the ASDA withdrew. Ellicott ultimately found that, although it was
clear that Vinnicombe had taken steroids, the sanctions imposed on him
were invalid because the strict ASDA procedures for doping control had
not been followed."2 4 Vinnicombe's proceeding against the ASDA re-
mained outstanding because of the ASDA's refusal to participate in the
mediation or abide by the mediator's conclusions.
As a direct response to Vinnicombe's challenge, the ASDA Act was
amended.'25 Among other things, the amendments enabled the ASDA
to recognize procedures adopted by foreign anti-doping authorities test-
ing on its behalf, even if those procedures do not precisely follow those
set out in the ASDA Regulations. The minimum standard for recog-
nized doping control procedures will be those provided for in the Inter-
national Olympic Charter Against Doping in Sport.
The fact that the legislation was introduced prior to resolution of the
Vinnicombe legal action is recognition of a certain rigidity in the ASDA
Act and its Regulations. It also illustrates the risks of a fully legislative
scheme for doping control with the attendant difficulties and inconven-
ience of amending legislation whenever changes are desired or dictated
by legal challenges, successful or otherwise. Ironically, Vinnicombe
withdrew his proceeding against the ASDA on the eve of the trial.12 6
Court of Australia, New South Wales District Registry, General Division, No. G65 of 1992,
Referee's Decision, April 4, 1992, at 2.
124. Id. at 13. The decision generated the predictable outcry that Vinnicombe "got off on
a technicality." An Australian Sport Federation official is quoted as describing the lifting of
Vinnicombe's suspension as "a national disgrace" permitted by a legal "loophole." See Vin-
nicombe in the clear as ban is lifted,, THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, April 25, 1990, at 64.
125. An Act to amend the Australian Sports Drug Agency Act 1990, introduced in the
Commonwealth Senate, May 26, 1992.
126. Meeting with Trish Kavanagh, counsel for the ASDA, in Ottawa, Canada, (June 29,
1993). The Australian legal situation has other interesting aspects, not the least of which is the
problem of doping control arguably constituting a "restraint of trade" when it leads to sanc-




The demise of Vinnicombe's challenge to the ASDA's reliance on the
doping control procedures of its Canadian counterpart lifted a cloud
from implementation of the Trilateral Agreement. However, the case
raises the spector that participating doping control authorities might
have to adopt the particular procedures and paperwork of the athlete's
home jurisdiction for doping control conducted out-of-jurisdiction. This
would compound the possibility of procedural errors compromising the
requisite integrity of at least sample collection.
This sort of possibility is one factor that is leading national doping
control authorities to further harmonize doping control procedures. Per-
haps this will ultimately result in a common procedure and common doc-
umentation for use world-wide. Such international standardization can
only be helpful in the long run. 27 Furthermore, the apparent failure of
international sport organizations to take matters in hand leaves a vac-
uum that invites occupation by government-sponsored bodies such as
the Canadian Centre for Drug-free Sport and the Australian Sports
Drug Agency.
But international standardization has its own legal difficulties. The
variations in and vagaries of domestic law will make it difficult to ho-
mogenize the legal protections and procedures that are properly part of
doping control. In late 1990, a Doping Control Review Panel of The
Athletics Congress in the United States was constituted to hear a chal-
lenge to a positive test by shotputter Randy Barnes. While the Panel
upheld the positive test and resultant suspension, it was clearly uncom-
fortable with the legal tests it had to apply pursuant to the sport federa-
tion rules governing the challenge which it found out-of-step with
American law.'28 On the other hand, the Panel implicitly recognizes the
han Professional Cycling Council Incorporated, unreported decision of the Supreme Court of
New South Wales, Equity Division, No. 3357 of 1992, August 26,1992. See also Hayden Opie,
Legal Regimes for the Control of Performance-enhancing Drugs in Sport", 12 ADELAIDE
LAW REviEw 332 (1990) (giving a general commentary on the situation in Australia).
127. Among others, the Prince Alexandre de Merode, Chairman of the Medical Commis-
sion of the International Olympic Committee, outlined future prospects for increasing harmo-
nization of anti-doping regimes in his closing remarks at the Fourth Permanent World
Conference on Anti Doping in Sport, London, England (Sept. 8, 1993) (conference statement
on fie with author).
128. "We agree with Mr. Barnes' contention that it is unfair for the IAAF to place an
impossible burden on the athlete to prove that someone tampered with the sample,
rather than the testing authorities to demonstrate that a reliable chain-of-custody of the
evidence was maintained. The Doping Control process, as it is currently constituted, is
purposely one-sided. The goal is to put the burden on the guilty to prove their inno-
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value of and need for universal rules of sport (including those for doping
control) which govern participants regardless of nationality.
C. Blood Testing
Doping control by means of urine sampling will be augmented by
blood testing by the time of the 1994 Winter Games. Cross country ski-
ers have been subject to blood testing conducted by the F6d6ration In-
ternationale de Ski at international competitions since 1989.129 In
August, 1993, the International Amateur Athletic Federation amended
its doping control procedural guidelines to provide for the collection of
blood samples.'3 0 The invasive nature of taking a blood sample, as op-
posed to passing a urine sample, is bound to heighten the legal concerns
surrounding doping control.' 3 1 What is certain is that the issues raised
by doping control are legally dynamic and show no signs of early or easy
resolution.
V. CONCLUSIONS
So why do men and women take these risks [of using steroids and
other banned drugs]? A candid answer was given by Canadian
sprinter and colleague of Ben Johnson, Tony Sharpe: "The glory
is too sweet, the dollars too much."
cence. Unfortunately, some innocent athletes may get caught in this trap. This Panel
recognizes, however, that if the United States is to be part of the international track
and field community, TAC must comply with international rules. TAC's own rules
mandate it to do just that."
In the Matter of Randy Barnes, Decision of the TAC Doping Control Review Panel, Jan. 4,
1991, at 17 (cite omitted).
129. See Tapio Videman, et. al., Experiences in Blood Doping Testing at the 1989 World
Cross-country Ski Championships in Lahti, Finland (1989) (unpublished paper prepared for
the F6ddration International de Ski, (1989) on file with the author).
130. PROCEDURAL GUIDELINES FOR DOPING CONTROL, § 5 (Aug. 1993) (giving guide-
lines for both doping control during competition and out of competition testing).
131. See, e.g., Joseph de Pencier, Blood Aanalysis and Doping Controll-Legal, Social
and Organizational Issues, (paper presented to the Second International Symposium on Drugs
in Sport, Lillehammer, Norway, August 29, 1993). In his 1992-1993 Annual Report, the Pri-
vacy Commissioner of Canada expresses he same concern: "It is frightening to think that some
people will contemplate violating the very physical integrity of human beings, an integrity
protected for centuries by law, in the name of men and women playing games." Id. at 35 (on
file with author). The Canadian Center for Drug-free Sport is taking a wait-and-see attitude at
present (December, 1993) pending reports from the International Amateur Athletics Federa-
tion and the Lillehammmer Olympic Games organizers, as well as its own research. See Cana-
dian Center for Drug-free Sport, Position Paper on Blood Sampling (October, 1993) (on file
with author).
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The glory and the dollars have been too much for the administra-
tors as well as for the athletes. As "amateur" sport began to at-
tract new money from TV and sponsorship, it was not only the
athletes who benefited. The federations grew in prestige and
wealth. It could all be lost if the public discovered that many of
their heroes were pumped up with illicit drugs. These fears cre-
ated a culture of blindness. Sports officials who should have been
rooting out doping looked the other way. Worse still, they then
began to protect their stars from exposure. 132
In Canada, anti-doping matters are hardly under the control of sport
governing bodies. In the wake of the Dubin Inquiry and given the his-
tory of government involvement in doping control, is it any surprise?
Some say this is a result of sport governing bodies abdicating their re-
sponsibilities to ensure fair competition. The full effects of this lack of
control are not complete. They remain to be seen, especially as the Ca-
nadian Centre for Drug-free Sport consolidates responsibilities for all
aspects of doping control, from testing procedures to legal mechanisms
for review.
However, it also remains to be seen if the independent testers and
the lawyers who are replacing sport officials as the main actors in anti-
doping matters will have any more success than their predecessors in
eradicating the abuse of drugs by some athletes and their entourages.
Troubling is the fact that with lawyers comes the encouragement and the
means for challenging doping control. The "glory" and the "dollars"
have seen to that. The legal aspects are becoming the focus of doping
control, at the expense of deterring and catching cheaters. Ironically, it
appears that parallel to the loss of control over anti-doping by sport bod-
ies, ensuring fair competition is becoming less of a concern than protect-
ing the rights of individuals accused of doping. The result may be exactly
the ethical and moral erosion in sport Mr. Justice Dubin and others fear.
The possibility accentuates the need to ensure a balance in doping con-
trol between the collective need for effective testing and the individual
need for fair procedures. The possibility also emphasizes the absolute
requirement that both testing and legal procedures be designed and ad-
ministrated with the fundamental purpose of doping control in mind: en-
suring the integrity of athletic competition.
132. SIMSON & JENNINGS, supra note 20, at 187-188.
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